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Theological Aesthetics and the Many Pragmatisms of Alejandro
García-Rivera
Christopher D. Tirres
DePaul University

M

y first encounter with Alejandro García-Rivera
was through a letter. In the late 1990s, I had
applied to the doctoral program at the Graduate Theological Union (GTU), and a few weeks after having been
accepted, I received a personal letter of invitation from
him. In the letter, Alex (as I would be privileged to call
him later) described the GTU as a promising new center
for the study of theological aesthetics. I was intrigued by
this phrase, “theological aesthetics,” for it was new to me.
Moreover, I was deeply touched by the fact that Alex took
the time to correspond with me personally. I felt honored
that such a respected academic would go out of his way
to reach out to me.
As things turned out, I ended up staying on the East
Coast for my doctoral work. Fortunately, however, through
the Academy of Catholic Hispanic Theologians of the
United States (ACHTUS), I eventually got to know Alex
and many of his talented students. Over the years, I have
been impressed to hear stories of how deeply Alex cared for
them. Especially significant is the fact that Alex directed to
completion the largest number of Latina Ph.D. theologians
in the United States.1 By all accounts, he was a Doktorvater
in the deepest and best sense of the word.
In what follows, I will reflect a little on Alex’s engagement with U.S. pragmatism, an area in which I do
work as well.2 Let me say up front that my approach to
pragmatism has much in common with Alex’s, but it also
diverges from it in some respects. As for similarities, we
both take everyday experience as a methodological starting
point and ending point; we are both interested in offering
a non-reductive account of reality; and we both take the
question of aesthetics seriously. As for differences, one
might point to the fact that Alex and I were introduced
to pragmatism in two different intellectual settings. At
Berkeley, and owing much to the influence of Don Gelpi
and Frank Oppenheim, Alex gravitated toward the work
of Charles Sanders Peirce and Josiah Royce. I, in turn,
studied under Cornel West, Hilary Putnam, and David
Lamberth, and, as a consequence, I read more William
James and John Dewey.
Accordingly, when I read Alex’s work in pragmatism, I
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always feel stretched. He reframes pragmatism in ways that
are refreshing and original and yet, at times perplexing and
elusive. Throughout his many works, Alex draws on Peirce
and Royce to shore up what he sees as a promising, yet still
somewhat deficient, articulation of theological aesthetics
in the work of Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar.
As Alex explains, theological aesthetics should encompass
more than Alexander Baumgarten’s classic articulation of
aesthetics as the science of sensory knowledge. Instead, for
Alex, theological aesthetics begs “a more profound question:
what moves the human heart?” This question, he maintains,
“brings us closer to the mysterious experience of the truly
beautiful, an experience that transcends geological space
and prehistoric time …”3 While Alex credits von Balthasar
for restoring the ancient theological insight that we know
God best through, he also shows how the semiotic logic
and the metaphysics of relations, as developed by Peirce
and Royce, can give philosophical clarity and depth to von
Balthasar’s position.
As one charts the development of Alex’s thought
from early to later writings, one sees that he adds John
Dewey’s voice to his pragmatic repertoire. On numerous
occasions, such as in A Wounded Innocence: Sketches for
a Theology of Art (2003), Alex speaks glowingly of Dewey,
who is widely recognized as one of the most important
philosophers and social critics of the twentieth century.
Yet, Alex’s appropriation of Dewey sometimes gives rise
to moments of paradox and ambiguity. In what follows,
I’d like to reflect on some of these moments in order see
where Dewey’s pragmatism both fits, and does not fit,
within Alex’s line of thinking.
One of Alex’s most explicit statements on Dewey
is found in his 2006 essay, “Interfaith Aesthetics: Where
Theology and Spirituality Meet.” Drawn to Dewey’s understanding of “the religious,” Alex correctly notes that
Dewey separates out institutional religion from a naturally
occurring sense of “the religious.” Today, this distinction is
roughly akin to the difference between being a “religious
person” versus being a “spiritual person.” The former usually
has a lot to do with adhering to the tenets of institutional
religion (Dewey’s “religion”), while the latter speaks to

A Tribute to Alejandro García-Rivera 59

Christopher D. Tirres

an innate sense of spirituality within all human beings,
irrespective of one’s affiliation with institutional religion
(Dewey’s “religious”). Alex writes approvingly of Dewey’s
“rather provocative thesis” which “attempt[s] an expanded
notion of faith.” Dewey’s faith, he explains, is “a faith open
to something bigger than itself.” It is a faith that “points to
a unity of a whole.”4
Somewhat paradoxically, however, Alex then immediately moves into a discussion of how Dewey’s insight can
be applied to Roman Catholic debates around the nature of
Christian faith. Alex draws a distinction between Vatican
I’s “extrinsic” understanding of faith, which required the
“submission of the intellect and will to truths that God
reveals to men and women,” and Vatican II’s more “intrinsic” understanding of faith, wherein faith is “rooted
in the historical, experiential process culminating in Jesus
Christ, who reveals to the human his and her very nature.”5
In drawing this parallel, Alex seems to suggest that
Dewey’s own organic understanding of faith is akin to
the vision of faith articulated in Vatican II. This parallel,
I would argue, is correct, but only up to a certain point.
Dewey would indeed eschew Vatican I’s extrinsic view of
faith as an assent to doctrine. But it is only partially correct,
however, to assume that he would affirm Vatican II’s more
intrinsic understanding of faith. In other words, Dewey
would affirm that faith is indeed “rooted in the historical,
experiential process,” but the mature Dewey would never go
so far as to say that this process culminates in Jesus Christ,
as Alex suggests. Thus, I think Alex overstretches his use
of Dewey here. This is not to say that Dewey couldn’t—or
indeed shouldn’t—be reconstructed in such a way as to be
applicable and relevant to institutional religions, Roman
Catholicism included. In fact, my own work probes this
very possibility.6 But what I am saying is that this kind of
reconstruction requires a more explicit analysis of where,
exactly, Dewey falls short in his analysis of institutional
religion as well as where we may use his insights productively and creatively.
A second, and arguably more substantial, tension
between Alex and Dewey has to do with their respective
understandings of “the unity of the whole.”7 Since Alex
never addresses Dewey’s understanding of this idea, we
must momentarily take a step back and extrapolate where
such a discussion might have occurred. I believe that Alex’s
discussion of Peirce’s aesthetics takes us closest to this issue.
In order to appreciate Alex’s use of Peirce, a word or
two must be said about the thinkers that, for Alex, lead up
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to Peirce. As already mentioned, Alex turns to the semiotic
logic of Peirce to add philosophical depth to von Balthasar’s
theological aesthetics. Equally significant, he also turns to
Peirce to overcome the nominalism of William of Ockham,
a 14th century scholastic philosopher. As Alex shows, Peirce
and Ockham vary significantly in their response to the
question: “Can something real be said about two very
different individuals that somehow applies to both of them
without destroying their individuality?”8 For William of
Ockham, the answer is no. According to Alex, Ockham
presupposes an “anthropocentric epistemology” in which
the human creature knows only percepts (the data of sense)
and concepts (the constructs of the mind), with the burden
of epistemology falling on the latter. As a consequence, a
concept has “reality only to the mind; it is not found in
the physical world.”9
Alex takes issue with Ockham’s epistemology, both for
playing down the role of perception, which has traditionally
been so central to aesthetics, and, even more significantly,
for approaching reality dyadically. For Ockham, there are
only two possibilities: We understand reality either through
percept or through concepts.
In response, Alex turns to the thought of Duns Scotus,
an English contemporary of Ockham, who adds “a third
element to reality.” Alex explains:
There exists the physical world of
the individuals. There also exists the
conceptual world of the mind. There
exists, however, a further third reality,
a metaphysical reality that has one foot
in the physical world and the other foot
in the mental world. This metaphysical
reality, the Common Nature, is part of
the reality found alongside the physicality of the unique individual even
if it can only be “seen” by the mind. If
the physical individual corresponds
to a visible reality, then the Common
Nature corresponds to an invisible
reality, a reality independent of the
mind and only “seen” by it.10
Alex is drawn to this position, for it underscores three
different, yet related, modes of being: the physical, the
logical, and the metaphysical. Alex is especially interested in
the latter, the metaphysical being, Scotus’ ens reale, which,
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says Alex, “can only be seen by the ‘mind,’ a reality that
bridges the chasm” between the physical and the mental.11
Put another way, Scotus’ metaphysical being serves as an
important principle of difference that is related to, but
distinct from, the other two modes of being. All told,
Scotus’ triadic approach proves so pivotal because it helps
to “assure the reality of the universal.”12
As helpful as Scotus is for Alex, Alex finds that Scotus
does not sufficiently explore the implications of this third
reality, metaphysical being, for an aesthetics. As Alex puts
it, Scotus’ world, “a world that is experienced not simply
by percept and concepts but also by a reality invisible and
‘in-between,’” is a world that is ready-made for an aesthetics.
Such a world “can entertain aesthetics not simply as passive
perception of beauty, nor the purely active act of mind, but
as a making visible the invisible, an act that involves … the
whole creature.”13 By taking into account this “invisible
reality,” such a world “allows room for the spiritual.” In
a sentence that encapsulates much of what his project is
all about, Alex writes: “An invisible metaphysical reality
makes the mind’s act a spiritual act of ‘seeing’ rather than
a mechanical ‘connecting’ of perceptions.”14 Accordingly,
Alex wants to extend Scotus’ thought so that it is more
attentive to this third “in-between” and “invisible” reality
that “allows room for the spiritual.”
In order to move in this direction, Alex turns to the
thought of C.S. Peirce, who, “working from Scotus’ foundation, developed a logic based on the metaphysics of relations
rather than the metaphysics of substance.”15 Peirce therefore
proves indispensible for Alex because he “introduce[s] a
new way to understand the transcendentals.”16
As I read Alex, there are four primary reasons why
he is drawn to Peirce. First, as just indicated, Peirce helps
shift the discussion of aesthetics from a discussion about
a metaphysics of substance to a metaphysics of relations.
In doing so, Peirce reframes von Balthasar’s (more “substantial”) understanding of “seeing the form” to a more
pragmatic understanding of the logic of sign.17 For Alex,
sign not only “refers to making visible the invisible,” but
also underscores how substance and Being are intrinsically
relational. Second, Alex is drawn to the social dimensions
of Peirce’s (and, later, Royce’s) thought. “Logic,” Peirce
writes, “is rooted in the social principle.”18 By this, Peirce
means to say that the validity of any given belief or idea is
tantamount to what a community of inquirers, through
the process of sign interpretation, would understand as
true in the infinite long run. Thus, for Alex and Peirce
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alike, a logic of signs always presumes much more than
the mental processes of any single individual. Rather, it is,
by necessity, always a communal affair.
Third, Alex is drawn to Peirce’s idea of the aesthetically
“good” as a “quality” of experience. Peirce writes:
In the light of the doctrine of categories, I should say that an object,
to be esthetically good, must have a
multitude of parts so related to one
another as to impart a positive quality
to their totality; and whatever does this
is, in so far, esthetically good, no matter
what the particular quality of the total
may be. If that quality be such as to
nauseate us, to scare us, or otherwise
disturb us to the point of throwing us
out of the mood of esthetic enjoyment
. . . then the object remains nonetheless
esthetically good, although people in
our condition are incapacitated from
a calm esthetic contemplation of it.19
Alex appreciates Peirce’s approach here because it “flings
the objects of aesthetic appreciation out of the museum
into the universal world of experience.”20 As Alex makes
clear from his very earliest works, the aesthetic symbols of
Hispanic popular religion—the “little stories” of popular
devotion that are found not in museums or books, but
rather, in everyday life—can give tremendous insight into
the meaning, and even mystery, of our humanity.21 Alex thus
agrees with Peirce that any experience has the potential to
be aesthetic in quality, even those that we do not typically
associate with fine art or with beauty.
Last but not least, Alex agrees with Peirce that aesthetic
ends serve as regulative ideals. The “End is something that
gives sanction to action,” writes Peirce.22 For Alex, this
means simply that “Actions, to be logical, must be guided,
indeed, initiated, by Ends.”23 Thus understood, the end is
the regulative lightpost that helps to guide actions. Ends
give meaning and direction to action.
One may notice that these last two points regarding
aesthetic quality and the functional role of ideal ends are
especially pronounced in the work of John Dewey, to
whom we now return. In Art as Experience (1934), for
example, Dewey shifts our understanding of aesthetics from
a discourse around fine art to a more organic understanding
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of aesthetic quality, which has the potential to take root
in any and all forms of experience, everyday experiences
included. Indeed, Dewey’s aesthetics may be seen as a logical
outgrowth of his metaphysics, or theory of experience.
Likewise, Dewey also underscores the functional
character of ideal ends, which help to guide experience to
a sense of completeness, wholeness, and, as Dewey often
puts it, “consummation.” As Dewey explains in A Common
Faith (1934), religious symbols and religious figures are
reflections of “moral and other ideal values.” Historic
personages with divine attributes are “materializations
of the ends that enlist devotion and inspire endeavor.”24
This means that the power of religious symbols lies not in
the fact that they “exist already in some realm of Being,”
but rather, in the fact that they have been created by the
“idealizing imagination.” As reflections of ideal ends, they
gain authority over our volition and emotion. For Dewey,
the “reality of ideal ends as ideals is vouched for by their
undeniable power in action.”25
In light of these connections between Peirce and Dewey, we may now ask: Up to what point in Alex’s theological
aesthetics do these pragmatic thinkers prove valuable? Or,
put negatively, where, exactly, does (or would) Alex find
these pragmatists no longer useful?
An answer to this question is somewhat easy to determine in Alex’s assessment of Peirce. At the end of chapter
four of The Community of the Beautiful: A Theological
Aesthetics (1999), after having made a strong case for the
value of Peirce’s semiotics and aesthetics, Alex begins to
stake out his own ground, showing where Peirce’s thought
may reach its limits. For Alex, Peirce eventually comes
up short because he fails fully to address “the intrinsic
nature of aesthetic norms.”26 “Peirce’s logic of signs had
given a satisfying answer to the question of how the true
becomes discovered,” writes Alex, “but left open the implicit
question of what inspires such discovery in the first place!
In other words, the Community of the True has some
genesis. Something must account for initiating such a
pursuit.”27 For Alex, Peirce’s discussion of aesthetic ideals
is limited to a discussion of how one adopts ideals and
how ideals function; it does not fully take up the question
of the “the ideals in themselves.”28 It is at precisely this
juncture that Alex calls for a theological aesthetics. What
is required, he says, is “a theological presupposition so that
the philosophical may find its completeness.”29 Put another
way, “The dynamic nature of the aesthetic norm reveals
a theological presupposition, the symptom of divinity
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making itself manifest in the world of reason.”30If Alex
finds Peirce’s pragmatic approach to aesthetics somewhat
unsatisfying, I think he would have even more reservations
about Dewey’s aesthetics, given Dewey’s suspicion of any
talk about the intrinsic “nature” of “ideals in themselves.”
Dewey holds that an inherent vice of idealism is that
it converts naturally-occurring enjoyed meanings and
“consummations” of experience into antecedently and a
priori Realities31. The true power of an ideal lies not in its
purported intrinsic and self-standing “nature,” but rather,
in its role or function in guiding human action to a greater
sense of meaning and value. For Dewey, “To see the ideal
as ideal means to see it as a possibility of the present, not
as a pre-existent, self-established reality.”32
In Experience and Nature (1925, 1st ed.), for example,
Dewey argues that idealists, who otherwise extol the role of
thought and the ideals of human aspiration, nevertheless
often seek to prove once and for all that “these things are
not ideal but are real—real not as meanings and ideals,
but as existential being. Thus the assertion of faith in the
ideal belies itself in the making; these ‘idealists’ cannot
trust their ideal till they have converted it into existence
. . .”33 Dewey carries this critique forward in A Common
Faith when he writes:
[M]en have gone on to build up vast
intellectual schemes, philosophies, and
theologies, to prove that ideals are real
not as ideals but as antecedently existing actualities. They have failed to see
that in converting moral realities into
matters of intellectual assent, they have
evinced lack of moral faith. Faith that
something should be in existence as
far as lies in our power is changed into
the intellectual belief that it is already
in existence. When physical existence
does not bear out the assertion, the
physical is subtly changed into the
metaphysical.34
As I read both Alex García-Rivera and John Dewey,
I see significant overlap in their thinking, but I also see
marked differences. Dewey, it seems to me, would question
Alex’s underlying commitment to a philosophical idealism,
whereas Alex would likely want to push past Dewey’s
instrumentalism to a discussion of theology. Both positions
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no doubt warrant further investigation. On the one hand,
would Alex’s use of Royce represent a more acceptable
version of idealism to Dewey? On the other, is it possible to
develop a theological aesthetics from within the framework
of Peirce’s or Dewey’s aesthetics?
However one may choose to answer these questions,
one thing is abundantly clear: Alex rarely closes off conversations. He borrows eclectically from thinkers, weaving
a web that is greater than the sum of its parts. This fact
may lead us to two very different observations. In the first
place, Alex may be rightfully critiqued at times for leaving
individual threads in tension or at odds with one another.
In other words, at the analytical level, his method calls out
at times for more precision.35 I think it would be a real loss
if at least some of his colleagues, students, and friends
didn’t continue to tease out the analytical threads that run
in different directions throughout his work. This is part of
taking seriously Alex’s work and, in doing so, honoring it.
However, I also believe that we have much to learn
from thinking beyond the level of analysis to thinking more
inferentially, more speculatively, and more cosmically, as
Alex does. Alex carried out his intellectual work with the
mindset of an artist. He had an uncanny ability to piece
together discreet particulars into larger imaginative wholes.
And yet Alex was very up front about the fact that his method “leads to a certain style of writing that not everyone finds
to be their cup of tea.” Critics, he notes, may find his style
of writing “beautiful but imprecise, saying too much and
saying too little,” to which he humbly responds: “To critics
of my method and style, I beg forgiveness for giving offense.
Yet I believe whole-heartedly that we must begin to see the
interconnectedness of the world, to grasp its complexity,
even if our intellectual traditions have conditioned us to
seek a different type of grasping.”36
It may very well be, then, that Alex’s inferential way
of seeing the world is, in the larger scheme of things, much
more important than any particular cases of imprecision.
Alex invites us to switch our thinking to another register
of thinking, a register that Peirce would call musing, a
register of puzzlement, inference, and play. This is not
always easy to do, especially when most of us have been
trained to analyze things and break things down. Alex’s
scholarly contributions remind us, however, that although
the parts are important, we must never lose sight of the
whole that unites them. From Alex, we learn:
In variety, unity. In particularity, beauty.
Thank you, Alex.
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